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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
HOLMGREN BROTHERS, INC., a
Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

GERALD BALLARD a/k/a THOMAS
G. BALLARD & WINONA BALLARD, his wife & S E Y M O U R
GREAVES, a single man,
Defendants and Appellants.

13844

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff in the above entitled case brought action
pursuant to an oral contract for the sale of real property
between defendants-sellers and plaintiff-buyer. Plaintiff
complains that defendants have refused to complete the
sale of the property pursxiant to that oral contract and
asks for specific performance of that contract or damages. Defendants assert that said sale is void under the
statute of frauds.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Box Elder County, Judge
VeNoy Christofferson presiding, ruled that defendants
execute and deliver a warranty deed to plaintiff and that
plaintiff pay to defendants $18,500.00. The court further
ruled that defendants deliver to the court a deed from
the prior record owner of the property in question; restrained defendants from going on the property and
awarded plaintiff costs.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek dismissal of the action in that the
oral contract for the sale of the property is void under
the statute of frauds, U. C. A. 25-5-3. In the alternative,
defendants submit that the lower court erred in requiring
specific performance of the oral agreement and that the
matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions that plaintiff prove the value of the services
performed and benefits conferred by him on defendants
in order for any recovery.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June 1973 Gerald Ballard (hereafter defendant)
orally agreed with Holmgren Brothers, Inc. (hereafter
plaintiff) to convey to plaintiff approximately 160 acres
of real property situated in Hansel Valley, Box Elder
County (Tr. 4, 5). Defendant thought the property was
free and clear and intended to convey title to plaintiff
as it then stood (Tr. 8,14,15,16). However, at that time
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defendant was subject to several outstanding judgments
and plaintiff insisted that these judgments be paid prior
to dosing the sale (Tr. 10, 43, 44). Defendant objected
to this arrangement and informed plaintiff that he was
unwilling to sell the subject property under the terms
insisted on by plaintiff (Tr. 8, 9, 39, 45, 50). Plaintiff
then placed with Jack Shumway a check made payable
to First Security Bank Agent for the amount of the purchase price which check was to be forwarded to defendant at some future date (Tr. 17-23). This check was
never delivered to defendant and defendant was never
paid for the land (Tr. 23, 44). Defendant refused to
allow plaintiff to take possession of the subject property
(Tr. 8). Subsequently plaintiff visited defendant on at
least two occasions to see if it was still possible to put
the deal together (Tr. 45).
In late August or early September, plaintiff and defendant discussed weeding of the property and plaintiff
was given permission by defendant to enter upon and
weed the property for the purpose of protecting plaintiff's possible future investment (Tr. 8, 46). At that time
the sale was still uncertain (Tr. 46, 47). Shortly thereafter defendant finally and completely repudiated and
withdrew the offer and oral contract of sale (Tr. 8, 9, 39,
45, 50). Approximately one week later, after consulting
with his attorney, plaintiff entered the property without
permission for the purpose of disking and planting the
ground (Tr. 49). Plaintiff admitted that he was told by
defendant that the "deal was off" about one week prior
to the date he disked and planted the property and that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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part of plaintiff's motive in disking and planting the
property was to help enforce the oral contract by avoiding the statute of frauds (Tr. 39, 49). There was never
any writing setting forth the terms of the oral agreement
and Mrs. Ballard was not included in any of the discussions of sale (Tr. 47, 50). Plaintiff then brought the
instant action against defendants for specific performance.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE P L A I N T I F F SHOULD NOT BE
GRANTED SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
THE ORAL CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF
LAND BETWEEN HOLMGREN BROTHERS, INC. AND GERALD BALLARD BECAUSE THAT CONTRACT IS VOID UNDER 25-5-3 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1973
Supp.).
25-5-3 Utah Code Annotated (1973 Supp.) states:
Every contract for . . . the sale of any lands, or
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof,
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized in writing.
The alleged contract for the sale of land between plaintiff and defendant was not in writing and there was no
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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written note or memorandum of said alleged contract.
Thus the alleged agreement clearly falls within U. C. A.
25-5-3 and is therefore void. This is true even where the
terms of the oral contract are perfectly clear; the oral
contract is still void under the statute of frauds, Woolley
Loose, 57 Utah 336, 194 P. 908 (1920).
POINT II.
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT PART
PERFORMANCE BY PLAINTIFF TO TAKE
THE ORAL CONTRACT OUT OF THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Under certain narrow cidcumstances an oral contract
is enforced by the courts as an exception to U. C. A. 255-3 under U. C. A. 25-5-8 which allows the courts to compel specific performance in cases where sufficient partial
performance of the oral contract has been completed.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted minimum
standards for partial performance which must be met if
the statute of frauds is to be avoided. As discussed hereinafter, to avoid the statute of frauds or to invoke estoppel to assert the statute of frauds, a three part test
must be met:
(1) There must be possession with the acquiescence of the seller, (2) there must be material improvements on the land, (3) there must be payment for the
land.
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In addition, in order for the appropriate remedy to
be specific performance, a four part test must be met:
(1) The person performing must rely on the oral
contract to his detriment or injury, (2) the injury must
be of a sort that is not compensable through other means,
(3) enforcement of the statute of frauds must otherwise
operate to perpetrate a fraud on the performer, and (4)
the terms of the oral contract must be clear and certain.
An examination of each of these elements shows the
plaintiff to have no cause of action in the instant case.
(a)

Plaintiff did not have possession of the property with the acquiescence of defendant.

Mere presence on the land does not constitute possession. Possession must not only be actual and open
but it must also be definite and exclusive, and not concurrent with that of the vendor. It must indicate the
commencement of a new estate or interest. Price v.
Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767 (1906). In In re Madsen's
Estate, 123 Utah 327, 359 P. 2d 595 (1953), the court defined partial performance as "at least partial payment
plus possession with the acquiescence or consent of the
seller.9' In the same case the court held that possession
must pass under the contract.
In the instant case plaintiff's presence on the land
was clearly not possessory. First, the weeding activity
was only engaged in to protect a possible future investment or interest. Defendant arranged to pay plaintiff for the value of that work in the event the sale was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not consummated (Tr. 8, 9). It was not a possessory act
and did not constitute partial performance. Holmgren
did not rely on the oral agreement of sale, but instead
went to Ballard and discussed the weeding with him.
He asked and was granted permission to enter upon the
land for the purpose of weeding and there was an actual
or implied separate agreement for the weeding (Tr. 8,
9,46).
Second, the disking and planting done by plaintiff
were performed only after defendant expressly withdrew
and repudiated any offer or oral contract of sale. Plaintiff thus did not rely on the oral contract in acting to
disk and plant the ground. He performed only after consulting with counsel and approximately one week after
defendant repudiated the oral contract (Tr. 49). Immediately after planting was begun, plaintiff was again
approached by defendant and told that defendant was
unwilling to sell the ground and to stop planting and
leave the property (Tr. 50). Plaintiff acted not in reliance upon the oral contract, but after the fact, in the
express and admitted desire to avoid the statute of frauds
(Tr. 39, 48, 69). Plaintiff's acts were not in good faith,
and under the circumstances, to specifically enforce the
oral contract would work a fraud on defendant.
All possessory acts by plaintiff were made only after
the agreement was clearly repudiated by defendant on
at least two occasions and those actions and the risks
appurtenant thereto were taken voluntarily by plaintiff
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and alternative remedies are available to compensate
for the weeding and planting if appropriate.
(b)

Plaintiff did not make improvements on the
land sufficient to be considered as part perform<mce.

Merely making improvements will not alone take an
oral contract out of the statute of frauds, Clark v. Clark,
74 Utah 290, 279 P. 509 (1929). Improvements must be
permanent and valuable in nature to be considered as
partial performance. In Price v. Lloyd, supra, the court
held that such improvements must have a substantial
or permanent character. The improvements must be permanently beneficial to the land and involve a sacrifice
to him who made them. They must be made in reliance
on the oral contract (see also In re Madsen's Estate,
supra), and the value of the improvements made must
exceed the rental value of the premises.
[The improvements must be] regarded as of such
a substantial value and character as to constitute part performance so as to take the case out
of the statute. Price v. Lloyd, supra.
Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold Mining
Co., 103 Utah 249, 134 P. 2d 1094 (1943), discusses the
standard of sufficiency for improvements for partial performance as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. In
Mercur, the court required the financial investment to
be of major proportion to the property in order to constitute part performance. In that case, the improvements
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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were not only permanent and valuable, they were also
unique and therefore not compensable through money
damages. In addition, Price v. Lloyd, supra, held that
a finding based on the evidence that the improvements
made to the subject property were permanent and valuable is required before the court can take notice of such
facts. And Boston v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P. 2d
332 (1956), requires the possession and improvements to
be in reliance on the oral contract and requires detriment
or injury to the party relying on the oral contract.
In the instant case the weeding did not constitute
a permanent improvement. It is rather the type of improvement that a tenant on land might make which is
distinguished from a permanent improvement in Price
v. Lloyd, supra. An alternative remedy that defendant
pay plaintiff for the weeding performed is clearly available.
Further, the disking and planting were not sufficient
improvements under the partial performance standard
to avoid the requirements of the statute of frauds.
Neither disking nor planting is a permanent improvement. Since the planting, plaintiff has harvested and sold
the wheat planted. By the date of trial the property was
substantially in the same condition that it was in at the
date of the oral contract for sale.
Plaintiff has received the benefit of the use of the
land without paying any compensation to defendant in
the form of rent or otherwise. It is noted that there has
been no evidence placed before the court by the plaintiff
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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showing the amount of damages suffered through planting and disking the land. Plaintiff made no permanent
improvements on the land.
(c)

Defendant was never paid for the land.

The evidence indicates that the only payment made
by plaintiff was in the form of a check made payable to
First Security Bank, Agent, and delivered to Jack Shumwayl, an officer of said bank, which payment was to be
forwarded to defendant at some future date (Tr. 17-33).
Defendant never received that payment (Tr. 23, 24). Defendant never asked for payment (Tr. 23) and plaintiff
never instructed Mr. Shumway to deliver the payment
to defendant (Tr. 23, 44).
Even if payment had been made it is clear that mere
payment of pecuniary consideration is not sufficient justification for specifically enforcing an oral contract to
convey land. 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §494,
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P. 2d 570 (1953),
33 A. L. R. 579 (1924).
The instant case fails entirely to meet this standard
for avoiding the statute of frauds. The tender of payment was not to nor has it ever been in the possession
of defendant. It was a check made out to a third party
and tendered to that third party. It was never paid to
defendant and plaintiff suffered no injury or detriment
as a result of placing the check which was never cashed
in the hands of said third party.
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(d)

Specific performance is not an appropriate
remedy in this case.

Specific performance is an extreme remedy. It should
be used only when no other remedy would be adequate
and any other remedy would result in a fraud being
worked on the performing party and is not applicable
in this case:
(1) As already discussed, plaintiff did not rely on
the oral contract in entering on or working on the property,
(2) All improvements made by plaintiff are compensable without specific performance.
(3) In order for a fraud to be perpetrated the
party performing must be acting in good faith and the
performance must be of such a nature so as not to be
compensable except through specific performance. Baugh
v. Barley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P. 2d 335 (1947):
Utah law is clear that to enforce the contract in equity the services rendered must be
of such nature that the value thereof cannot be
ascertained with reasonable accuracy in an action at law, and be adequately compensated for
by the recovery of damages. Brinton v. Van
Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 P. 218, (1898), Randall v.
Tracy Collins Trust Company, 6 Utah 2d 18, 305
P. 2d 480 (1956).
The case law clearly requires the perpetration of a
fraud as a minimum standard for avoiding the statute of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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frauds. The doctrine of part performance is only to be
applied with great care, with particular attention to the
statute of frauds and the historical precedent therefore.
In the case of Ravarino v. Price, supra, where the court
held that a tender of purchase price plus related acts
of partial performance were not sufficient to take the
oral contract out of the statute of frauds, the court articulated the following standard:
Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine
involved by plaintiff have not, by any means,
intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only
to prevent its being made the means of perpetrating fraud. In order that a plaintiff may be
permitted to give evidence of a contract not in
writing, and which is in the very teeth of the
statute and a nullity of law, it is essential that
he establish, by clear and positive proof, acts
and things done in pursuance and on account
thereof, exclusively referable thereto and which
take it out of the operation of the statute. (Emphasis added.)
In Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold Mining, supra, the Supreme Court held that partial performance which will avoid the statute of frauds must consist
of an act which puts the party performing in such a position that the non-performance of the other party would
constitute fraud. Thus the statute of frauds, the case
law, and U. C. A. 25-5-3 require the circumstance of fraud
to exist before partial performance is allowed to compel
specific performance of the contract. In addition, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cases require that the performing party be injured and
that such injury be unjust and unconscionable, such that
there is no complete or adequate remedy at law.
In Easton v. Wycoff, supra, the court in denying
an equitable estoppel argument to assert the statute of
frauds stated,
It is an indispensable element of equitable estoppel that the person relying thereon must have
been induced to act or alter his position to his
detriment or injury and where equitable estoppel
is relied on to preclude another from asserting
the statute of frauds as a defense to an oral
contract. . . such injury must be unjust and unconscionable, and such that there is no complete
and adequate remedy at law available to the
person asserting equitable estoppel. (Emphasis
added.)
It is clear that fraud is a necessary element of any
argument that an oral contract for the sale of land should
be specifically enforced. Yet plaintiff has failed to even
mention fraud at any place in the record (R. 88-90, 97101). Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that fraud be plead with particularity.
Rule 9. Pleading Special Matters.
(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind.
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be
stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person
may be averred generally.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the instant case failure to specifically enforce this
contract will clearly not work a fraud on plaintiff. Plaintiff fails to meet any of the standards for fraud herein
set forth.
(4) In addition, to enforce an oral contract by waiving the statute of frauds the terms of that oral contract
must be established to a greater degree of certainty than
would be required to establish the same contract in an
action where the contract is written. Montgomery v.
Barrett, 40 Utah 385, 121 P. 569 (1912). The oral agree*ment between the parties here is not clear and unambiguous as required by law. There is disagreement as to a
material fact. Plaintiff alleges that defendant was required as part of the oral agreement to first pay off his
existing judgments. Defendant contends that that was
not part of the oral agreement. Therefore, the first standard for avoiding the statute of frauds, that of clear
specificity of agreement, has not been met. The statute
was designed to prevent this kind of contention over
terms in contracts for the sale of land. Furthermore, Mrs.
Ballard was not included in any of the discussions or
agreements of sale (Tr. 47, 50).
The terms of this oral contract are not clear enough
to be specifically enforced in equity. This issue goes to
the heart of the alleged oral contract and reinforces the
statutory requirement of writing. Such oral contracts
are void. Utah Code Annotated, 25-5-3 (1973 Supp.).
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has completely failed to meet standards
accepted by the Utah Supreme Court for partial performance sufficient to avoid the statute of frauds. The
partial performance did not meet the Mercur or the Price
v. Lloyd standard and material parts of the agreement
are unclear. All of the improvements made are compensable without the requirment of specific performance. None
are permanent or unique.
There was never possession with the acquiescence
or consent of the seller. The weeding was not possessory
under the oral contract. The weeding was done by separate agreement between the parties to protect the possible future interest that plaintiff might have in the land.
The later entry on the land for planting was done
only after the repudiation of the oral contract. Defendant clearly objected to any possession by plaintiff and
plaintiff knew that he entered the land in violation of
the defendant's rights and wishes. There was no reliance
by plaintiff on the oral contract. He acted not in good
faith, but with the express purpose of avoiding the statute of frauds.
The statute of frauds is a valid and necessary part
of the body of law of the state of Utah. Part of its value
lies in promoting certainty in contracting. This is evident in the instant case. The parties never had a meeting of the minds. The terms of the purchase and sale
were never clear as between the parties and plaintiff's
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claim for specific performance is exactly the kind of abuse
the statute is designed to prevent.
The late Professor Karl Llewellyn is quoted as say-

After two centuries and a half the statute stands,
in essence better adapted to our needs than when
it was first passed . . . [Tjhe net effect of the
two rules together [the statute and the parol evidence rule], as they work into lay practice, and
viewed simply in their effect outside of litigation, is almost certainly wholesome; both encouraging permanent trustworthy record of
agreements, and in inducing care in the making
of that record.
Llewellyn, Contracts — An Essay in Perspective,
40 Yale L. J. 704, 747-48 (1931).
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